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HIV Testing and Insurance Applicants:
Exploring Constitutional Alternatives to
Statutory Protections
By SANDRA ELIZABETH STONE*
Introduction
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) poses one of the
most serious public health threats in history. In the United States alone,
an estimated two million people have been infected with Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus (HIV), the virus that causes AIDS.1 Experts expect
the number of reported AIDS cases to continue increasing.2 Recent sta-
tistics estimate there are 211,337 people with AIDS in the United States,
and 141,223 people have died from AIDS.
AIDS' cost in human lives is immeasurable, but it is also having
other profound effects. In particular, AIDS is proving an expensive bur-
den on an already over-taxed health care system.4 Even though patients
diagnosed with AIDS once had an extremely short life expectancy,5 new
developments in AIDS drugs have extended the lives of those with
AIDS.6 Increasing availability of medication, combined with the nature
of the disease, often results in expensive medical treatment and hospital
stays.7
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A., University of California, Los Angeles, 1989. I
would like to thank my family and especially Cindy Grijalva, D'vora Tirschwell, and Pat
Goldman for their help and support. This Note is dedicated to all those living with HIV and
AIDS and those working towards ending the AIDS pandemic.
1. Rosalind M. Kendellen, AIDS. A Clinical Statement, N.J. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at
14.
2. Id.
3. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE 5, 13 (April 1992) [hereinafter CDC].
4. Ruth E. Kim & Kimball R. McMullin, AIDS and the Insurance Industry: An Evolv-
ing Resolution of Conflicting Interests and Rights, 7 ST. Louis U. L.J. 155, 164 (1988).
5. In 1986, the average person diagnosed with AIDS was not expected to live more than
24 months. Id. at 162.
6. Grace Brooke et al., HIVDisease: A Review for the Family Physician, 42 ASS'N FAM.
PRAC. 971, 977-79 (1990).
7. Original estimates for medical treatment ranged from $30,000 to $150,000 per year.
Kim & McMullin, supra note 4, at 164. Current estimates, however, place the lifetime costs of
treatment between $50,000 and $80,000, often lower than costs for many other similar cata-
strophic illnesses. The aggregate health care cost of AIDS is 1% to 2% of total U.S. health
[1163]
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In a country with no national health care system,8 the financial bur-
den of AIDS falls primarily on three major groups: individuals with
AIDS who have neither private insurance nor Medicare or Medicaid,
government programs, and private insurance companies.'
Private insurance companies have experienced economic pressure
from AIDS-related claims. Industry cost figures for 1990 were $273.6
million for individual life policies and $374.8 million for group life poli-
cies. Health insurance costs for insurers were $94.2 million for individ-
ual policies and $439.7 million for group policies. The total amount
spent by the insurance industry on AIDS-related claims was $1.2
billion."1
Not surprisingly, the insurance industry has attempted to cope with
these new developments. A favored method of controlling costs involves
the use of HIV testing for health and life insurance applicants.' Use of
these tests, however, has drawn criticism from those concerned with
maintaining the confidentiality of test results.1 2
Unfortunately, reports of breaches of confidentiality by insurance
companies have occurred.1 3 Lack of uniformity in statutory regulation
leaves individual applicants in some states with minimal or no protec-
tion. Public fear of AIDS, combined with the power of insurers, has led
to a trend away from prohibiting HIV testing. 14 Even in states with a
relatively high level of statutory protection, breaches of confidentiality
occur, resulting in irreparable harm to individual applicants.1 5 The fail-
ure of statutory schemes to protect testing privacy argues for alternatives
to state statutory regulation. One unexplored alternative is the use of
care expenditures. Robert A. Padgug & Gerald M. Oppenheimer, AIDS. Health Insurance,
and the Crisis of Community, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 35, 35-36 (1990).
8. Studies indicate that approximately 80 million Americans have inadequate or no pri-
vate health insurance coverage. Kim & McMullin, supra note 4, at 164 n.59.
9. See Nancy Perkins, Prohibiting the Use of the HIV Antibody Test by Employers and
Insurers, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 275, 279-83 (1988).
10. Jeanne Dugan Cooper, AIDS Insurance Screening, NEWSDAY, Nov. 10, 1991, at 3
(citing statistics provided by American Council of-Life Insurance and the Health Insurance
Association of America). In 1990, these figures were dramatically greater than comparable
1986 figures: $93.3 million for individual life, $79.4 million for group life, $34.7 million for
individual health, and $84.8 million for group health. The total amount spent in 1986 was
$292.2 million. Id.
11. Kim & McMullin, supra note 4, at 166.
12. See, e.g., Benjamin Schatz, The AIDS Insurance Crisis: Underwriting or Overreach-
ing?, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1782, 1800-01 (1987).
13. See Alexander Peters, First Insurers Sued Under HIV Testing Privacy Rules, THE RE-
CORDER, Aug. 21, 1990, at 1.
14. Jerry V. MeMartin, AIDS (HIT' and Insurance: Discrimination Against HIV-Infected
Individuals, available in WESTLAW, TP-ALL File (Aug. 1990).
15. Peters, supra note 13, at 1; see infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text for further
discussion.
constitutional protection to regulate or eliminate HIV testing by insur-
ance companies.
This Note examines the possibility of extending constitutional pro-
tections to health and life insurance applicants currently required to sub-
mit to HIV testing. Section I reviews the background, nature, and details
of AIDS and HIV testing, including the use of testing by insurance com-
panies. Section II reviews the major types of state legislation currently
used to regulate HIV testing by the insurance industry. Section III ex-
amines potential constitutional protections for applicants, focusing on
privacy and confidentiality issues. Section IV analyzes claims made by
insurance companies in support of their right to test applicants. Poten-
tial alternatives to HIV testing are also discussed. Ultimately, while
proving difficult to establish and apply, constitutional challenges may be
the only way protect insurance applicants.
I. Background
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, commonly known as
AIDS, has become a household word since the disease emerged in the
early 1980s.16 AIDS results from infection by a virus known as the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). 17
The HIV virus has been detected in human blood, semen, vaginal
secretions, saliva, breast milk, tears, and urine."8 Transmission occurs
through an exchange of bodily fluids. Exchange usually happens in one
of three ways: sexual contact, 19 pre or post natal infection,20 or transmis-
sion through skin.21
Once in the body the HIV virus attacks cells crucial to the immune
system.22 These "T-cell lymphocytes" (T-cells) are responsible for trig-
gering the body's immune response.23 By interfering with the immune
system, HIV infection leaves the body unable to fight disease. Eventu-
ally, the immune system becomes so weak that one dies.24
16. RAMZI S. COTRAN ET AL., ROBBINS' PATHoLoGIc BASIS OF DISEASE, 224-25 (1989).
17. COTRAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 227.
18. Id. at 226.
19. Either anal-genital, genital-genital, or anal/genital-oral. Id. at 227.
20. Prenatal transmission occurs through exchange of bodily fluids in utero. Postnatal
transmission has been documented in breast feeding. Id. at 228.
21. This method, called parenteral inoculation, most commonly occurs when the virus
enters the skin through needles or blood transfusions. Id. at 227.
22. Id. at 228.
23. Judith A. Berman, Note, AIDS Antibody Testing and Health Insurance Underwriting:
A Paradigmatic Inquiry, 49 OHIo ST. L.J. 1059, 1060 (1989). Depletion of T-cells is a key
event in causing AIDS. COTRAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 228-29.
24. Berman, supra note 23, at 1060.
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A. The Three Major Stages of AIDS
AIDS is considered a "syndrome" because it has several distinct cat-
egories. Currently, the Centers for Disease Control divide HIV infection
into three categories.25 One category begins after exposure to the HIV
virus. The body's immune system develops antibodies to fight off the
HIV virus, just as it would in response to a cold virus. For unknown
reasons, this antibody development may not occur immediately. Latency
periods can range from six weeks to thirty-five months.26 Prior to devel-
oping antibodies the individual may show no sign of infection and appear
healthy.2 7
Another, later, category generally is marked by the development of
AIDS-related complex (ARC).2 8 ARC's signs include weight loss, night
sweats, persistent fever, and fatigue.2 9 Again, there may be a long la-
tency period between exposure and ARC.30 Notably, a substantial
number of HIV-positive people never manifest signs of ARC prior to
being diagnosed with AIDS.3"
In the third, and final, category, the patient is diagnosed as having
clinical AIDS. In addition to ARC symptoms, people with AIDS often
develop rare cancers such as Karposi's sarcoma and opportunistic infec-
tions such as pneumocystis pneumonia.32 This stage may occur well over
three years after the original HIV infection.33
Although researchers have developed drugs that help slow the pro-
gress of AIDS and help the body fight off opportunistic infections,3a no
proven cure or vaccine currently exists for AIDS or HIV infection.35
B. Testing for AIDS
Developing a test for AIDS and HIV infection was a priority in the
fight against AIDS. To date, several methods of detecting exposure to
the HIV virus exist.
25. COTRAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 224.
26. Ronald Goldschmidt, Current Report-HIV, 3 J. Am. BD. FAM. PPAc. 60 (1990).
Once these antibodies develop, the person is considered HIV positive.
27. Kim & McMullin, supra note 4, at 160. It is important to note, however, that the
virus can still be transmitted during this stage.
28. COTRAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 224.
29. Id. at 232; Kim & McMullin, supra note 4, at 160 n.34.
30. COTRAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 232-33.
31. Kim & McMullin, supra note 4, at 160.
32. See Brooke et al., supra note 6, at 1299-1308.
33. COTRAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 232-33.
34. See Brooke et al., supra note 6, at 1299-1308; Drugs for AIDS and Associated Infec-
tions, 33 MED. LETTER ON DRUGS & THERAPEUTICS 95, 95-102 (Mark Abramowicz ed.,
1991).
35. Drugs for AIDS and Associated Infections, supra note 34, at 95.
The most common test for AIDS is a two step process. First, the
tester administers the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA)
test.36 An ELISA test detects the presence of antibodies in the blood.
When the test reveals antibodies, the result is seropositive, indicating
HIV infection.3 7 The ELISA test results in false positives three to fifteen
percent of the time. 8
The large margin of error in the ELISA test provides the main rea-
son for using a follow-up test, usually the Western Blot test. Like the
ELISA, the Western Blot measures the presence of antibodies in the
blood. The Western Blot is far more accurate, however, than the
ELISA.39 A seropositive result using a Western Blot generally means
that the patient has been infected with the HIV virus.4
Although these tests have proved crucial in the identification and
treatment of HIV-positive individuals, commentators criticize them for
problems in administration and accuracy.4' Of specific concern is use of
an ELISA test, without a confirming Western Blot test,42 a decision often
motivated by economic concerns. 43  The undesirable result is an in-
creased chance of false positives.
Another, more fundamental, problem with current HIV testing is
that a true seropositive result can have two different meanings. The re-
sult may mean that although the individual was exposed to HIV, she
successfully fought off the infection, leaving only antibodies behind in the
bloodstream." On the other hand, a seropositive result could mean that
the individual was exposed to HIV and that the body did not fight off the
infection.45 Unfortunately, because doctors still know relatively little
36. Goldschmidt, supra note 26, at 60.
37. Id. at 61.
38. Id. at 60; Berman, supra note 23, at 1061. False positive rates vary depending on the
prevalence of HIV infection in the tested population. This consideration is important when
administering the test. Cyril H. Wecht, Considerations and Potential Pitfalls in AIDS Lab
Testing, 9 J. LEGAL MED. 623, 628-29 (1988).
39. Goldschmidt, supra note 26, at 60. As well as being more accurate, the Western Blot
is much more expensive.
40. Id. Up to 18% of Western Blot tests can result in indeterminate results and up to 5%
in false positives. Wecht, supra note 38, at 631.
41. See, Schatz, supra note 12, at 1784-85; Michael L. Closen et al., AIDS Testing De-
mocracy-Irrational Responses to the Public Health Crisis and the Need to Privacy in Serologic
Testing, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 835, 871-75 (1986).
42. Goldschmidt, supra note 26, at 60 ("Reactive ELISA tests require specific confirma-
tion with a Western Blot or equally specific test. .. ."). Manufacturers of ELISA tests usually
include warnings with the kits stating that it is an inappropriate test to use for diagnosis of
HIV status. Wecht, supra note 38, at 627.
43. Groups accused of this practice include insurance companies. Schatz, supra note 12,
at 1785-86; Berman, supra note 23, at 1061.
44. Berman, supra note 23, at 1061.
45. Berman, supra note 23, at 1061. Most doctors believe this is the correct assumption.
Mike McKee, Defense Puts AIDS Virus on Trial, THE RECORDER, Jan. 17, 1992, at 1.
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about how the AIDS virus affects people differently, there is no conclu-
sive way to know which interpretation is correct in a given case. This
problem is compounded by current testing methods that measure only
the presence of antibodies, the body's reaction to the virus, rather than
the virus itself.46
Other testing problems stem from the nature of the disease itself.
Because of long latency periods, negative test results do not rule out HIV
exposure.47 In addition, the long latency period leaves unanswered
whether, even if a patient has been exposed to HIV, he will always de-
velop AIDS.4" Thus, using an HIV test to predict AIDS remains
imprecise.
C. HIV Testing and Insurance Underwriting
Insurance companies showed great interest in HIV testing since its
introduction in 1985 and soon began to use test results as part of the
underwriting process.49 In one study, eighty-six percent of commercial
insurers either screened or planned to screen individual applicants for
HIV infection.50
Insurance is essentially a contractual obligation in which one party
pays premiums to an insurance company in return for a promise that
when certain contingencies are met, such as illness, theft, or death, the
company will make payments to the beneficiary named in the policy."1
In particular, health insurance reimburses certain medical expenses, and
life insurance pays a predetermined amount upon the insured's death. 2
Most health and life insurance is obtained through group policies, often
46. Update: Serologic Testingfor Antibody to HIV, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 833 (1988).
47. Berman, supra note 23, at 1062.
48. COTRAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 233. In 1986, the Centers for Disease Control
estimated that only 20% to 30% of seropositive individuals would develop AIDS over the next
five years, and other studies showed another 25% would develop ARC within two to five
years. Karen Clifford & Russel P. Iuculano, AIDS and Insurance: The Rationale for AIDS-
Related Testing, 100 HARV. L. REy. 1806, 1813 (1987). The causal link between HIV and
AIDS is generally accepted by the medical profession. See, eg., COTRAN ET AL., supra note
16. Recently, however, some prominent AIDS researchers have challenged the assumption
that HIV is the sole cause of AIDS. One scientist argues that AIDS is caused by "long-term
use of psychoactive drugs, multiple sexual contacts," or hemophilia. Although this position
remains unaccepted, if proven it would completely undermine HIV testing as a method to
predict AIDS. McKee, supra note 45, at 1.
49. ROBERT M. JARVIS ET AL., AIDS LAW 134 (1991); Lisa M. Tonery, AIDS A Crisis
in Health Care Financing, 40 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 133, 136-37 (1990).
50. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MEDICAL TESTING AND
HEALTH INSURANCE 3 (1988).
51. 1 GEORGE J. COUCH ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:2, at 4-6 (2d ed. 1984).
52. Id. § 1:60, at 143; § 1:73, at 227-28. "Health or sickness insurance is often defined as
insurance providing indemnification for losses caused by illness." "Life insurance is ... a
contract, whereby one for a stipulated consideration... agrees to pay another a certain sum of
provided by employers, social, or religious groups.53 Those who do not
qualify to take part in a group policy may purchase individual policies
written exclusively for them. 4
Individual insurance rates are determined using statistics based on
actuarial principles.5 Companies take different information about the
applicant, such as sex, age, and occupation, and calculate how likely that
person is to become ill or die. The higher the risk of illness attributed to
the individual, the higher the rates charged for coverage. This process is
known as "underwriting." 5 6 The resulting variance among different indi-
viduals' premiums is considered "fair discrimination."5 " This method of
setting premiums is regulated by state statutes, by industry standards
written by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC),58 and by case law interpreting the limits of "fair discrimina-
tion."5 9 Theoretically, underwriting helps keep insurance companies
running efficiently by matching costs with payments.60
In response to the AIDS crisis, some insurers attempted to identify
certain demographic "markers" to single out people at a greater risk of
contracting AIDS.61 Marital status, unusual beneficiaries, and certain
professions were used as key markers.62 This technique was frequently
employed for identifying gay men who insurers perceived as comprising a
substantial number of AIDS cases.63
money upon the happening of a given contingency which is the death of the insured under the
ordinary contract." Id. § 1:73, at 227-28.
53. Mark Scherzer, Insurance, in AIDS AND THE LAW 188 (Harlon L. Dalton et al. eds.,
1987). Group policies are based on one standard contract for all members and do not involve
the process of underwriting described here.
54. Approximately 30% of health insurance and about 60% of all life insurance policies
are written for individuals or small groups. Cooper, supra note 10, at 3.
55. Scherzer, Insurance, in AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 53, at 188.
56. Clifford & Iuculano, supra note 48, at 1807-08. "The primary goal of underwriting is
the accurate prediction of future mortality and morbidity costs." Id. at 1808.
57. Id. at 1810.
58. Section 4(7)(a) of NAIC's Unfair Trade Practices Act prohibits insurers from "mak-
ing or permitting any unfair discrimination between individuals of the same class and equal
expectation of life." Section 4(7)(b) contains a similar clause applicable to health insurance.
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, An Act Relating to Unfair Methods of
Competition and Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices in the Business of Insurance. 1972
Proc. NAIC 1 493, 495 (as amended). See Clifford & Iuculano, supra note 48, at 1810.
59. Clifford & luculano, supra note 48, at 1810. See Physicians Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Denenberg, 327 A.2d 415 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974).
60. See Scherzer, Insurance, in AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 53, at 188-89; Kim &
McMullin, supra note 4, at 155-56.
61. Kim & McMullin, supra note 4, at 165.
62. Schatz, supra note 12, at 1787.
63. Id. at 1786-88. Mark Scherzer, Insurance and Aids-Related Issues, in AIDS PRAc-
TICE MANUAL: A LEGAL AND EDUCATIONAL GUIDE ch. VIII, at 11 (Paul Albert et al. eds.,
1988).
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Other companies avoided writing policies in cities with high num-
bers of AIDS cases or specifically deleted AIDS from the policy's cover-
age. Each of these methods created a number of problems, including
discrimination based on sexual orientation."
Faced with discrimination claims and large numbers of undetected
HIV-positive applicants, many companies determined HIV testing would
be the best method to use in determining policy rates and coverage.6
Insurers claimed that HIV testing would provide them with an accurate
risk classifier, thus preventing potential economic harm.' The industry
claimed that HIV testing would aid their twin goals of economic effi-
ciency and fair risk distribution. 7 In addition, insurers argued it was
unfair to favor those infected with HIV over other applicants with seri-
ous medical conditions who were barred from obtaining insurance.6 8
II. Statutory Responses to HIV Testing
The insurance industry's proposal to require HIV testing for appli-
cants caused concern among commentators. 9 Under congressional
mandate, states are permitted to regulate the insurance industry. 0 Thus,
states individually adopted a variety of measures designed to regulate or
even eliminate the use of HIV testing. State regulation generally follows
three major approaches: (1) prohibiting the use of HIV tests by insur-
ance companies, (2) regulating the use of HIV tests, and (3) adopting
other provisions that limit discrimination against HIV-infected appli-
cants.7 1 Often there is an overlap of these approaches within one state.
The first approach is by far the most restrictive. Originally, states
such as California72 and the District of Columbia73 banned the use of
HIV testing for insurance purposes. Many states have since repealed
64. Scherzer, Insurance and AIDS-Related Issues, supra note 63 ch. VIII, at 11-12.
65. See Clifford & Iuculano, supra note 48.
66. Berman, supra note 23, at 1067-68.
67. Berman, supra note 23, at 1067.
68. Peter Hiam, Insurers, Consumers, and Testing: The AIDS Experience, 15 LAW, MED.
& HEALTH CARE 212, 214 (1987).
69. See Schatz, supra note 12; Perkins, supra note 9, at 289.
70. Perkins, supra note 9, at 288. The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 prohibits federal
legislation of insurance, subject to narrow exceptions. Id. This is despite the industry's size
and the fact that some insurers'do business in all fifty states. Hiam, supra note 68, at 213.
71. McMartin, supra note 14, at 5.
72. California law provides, "The results of a blood test to detect antibodies to the prob-
able causative agent of acquired immune deficiency syndrome... shall not be used in any
instance for the determination of insurability .... " CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 199.21(0 (Deering 1990).
73. As originally enacted, District of Columbia law stated, "An insurer may not deny,
cancel, or refuse to renew insurance coverage... because an individual has tested positive on
any test to screen for the presence of any probable causative agent of AIDS .... ." D.C. CODE
ANN. § 35-223(a) (1988).
these statutes, declaring them invalid.74 The original District of Colum-
bia statute, considered the strictest in the nation when it was adopted,
was modified in 1988 to permit HIV testing if insurers complied with
statutory guidelines.75 Similarly, the California code, which was written
to prevent HIV test results from impacting insurability,76 has since been
interpreted to allow HIV results to influence life, but not health, insur-
ance applicants.77 These statutes were successfully challenged by insur-
ance companies who often refused to sell policies to individuals located in
areas with restrictive legislation.78 The lesson learned from challenges to
the original generation of statutes is that, in order to survive, the laws
must be narrowly tailored.79 The difficulty of drafting workable legisla-
tion, combined with the possibility of an insurance boycott, discouraged
many states from attempting to implement overly restrictive statutes.80
Instead, most states have chosen to adopt legislation that allows in-
surers to use HIV tests, but closely regulates usage.8" These regulations
usually involve some combination of the following six factors: confiden-
tiality, consent, cost, prior tests, nondiscrimination, and notification.82
Confidentiality provisions generally prohibit unauthorized disclo-
sure of test results. 83 Despite these provisions, loopholes may exist. If
the statute specifically does not prohibit revealing HIV information to
other insurers, companies can effectively identify and exclude certain in-
dividuals from coverage by exchanging HIV information.84 In the alter-
native, insurers may be permitted to inform other insurers that an
74. McMartin, supra note 14, at 5-7. By June of 1987 only four states (California, Flor-
ida, Maine, and the District of Columbia) had laws which completely banned HIV testing for
underwriting purposes. Perkins, supra note 9, at 291.
75. D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-223, 224 (Supp. 1989). McMartin, supra note 14, at 6.
76. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.21(f) (Deering 1990).
77. CAL. INS. CODE § 799.09 (West Supp. 1992). It is of interest to note that it was while
applying for life insurance, and subsequently being tested, that basketball star Earvin "Magic"
Johnson discovered his HIV-positive status. Cooper, supra note 10, at 3.
78. McMartin, supra note 14, at 6. After the passage of the District of Columbia act in
1986, approximately 80% of the insurers doing business in D.C. stopped writing individual
policies. Perkins, supra note 9, at 297.
79. McMartin, supra note 14, at 7.
80. As of 1988, the vast majority of states (43) had no regulation prohibiting HIV testing
for health insurance applicants. Ruth R. Faden & Nancy E. Kass, Health Insurance and
AIDS: The Status of State Regulatory Activity, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 437 (1988).
81. McMartin, supra note 14, at 7.
82. Id. at 7-10.
83. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.5 (1990); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, % 5403
(1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 505.16 (West Supp. 1991); Mo. REv. STAT. § 191.671(5) (1990);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3901.46(C) (Anderson 1990); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.21-4(e)
(West 1990).
84. See McMartin, supra note 14, at 7-8; CAL. INS. CODE § 799.07 (West Supp. 1992) (an
example of a statute that explicitly bars such disclosure).
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individual received a negative underwriting or coverage decision. 5
Written, informed consent is also a common statutory requirement.
Valid consent usually must include (1) a description of confidentiality
limits and exceptions; (2) a description of the test, purpose, uses, limita-
tions, and results; and (3) a description of the procedures to be used in
notifying the applicant of test results.86 The insurance company may be
required to pay costs if applicants are required to submit to tests.8 7 In-
surers also may be prohibited from inquiring into prior HIV test
results.8 8
Non-discriminatory testing regulations attempt to prevent selective
testing based on demographic traits such as age, gender, and marital sta-
tus. Insurers must require equal testing of all applicants to prevent un-
fair discrimination against certain groups.89
States may also regulate the notification process. Statutes can re-
quire that certain procedures be followed, such as notifying the appli-
cant's doctor prior to the applicant.90 In addition, health laws may
require that notice be given to the state health department.91
Other states refrain entirely from restricting HIV testing and rely
instead on more traditional approaches to protect against unfair discrimi-
nation in determining who must be tested. Often, these protections are
aimed at gay men who are frequently targeted for testing. Legislation
may specifically ban discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.92
Or there may be more broad prohibitions against discrimination based on
gender, marital status, medical history, occupation, living arrangements,
or territorial classification. 93 All of this information is often used to de-
85. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, % 5403 (1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3901.46(C)(4) (Anderson 1990).
86. McMartin, supra note 14, at 8. See CAL. INS. CODE § 799.03(a) (West Supp. 1992);
D.C. CODE ANN. §35-226(a) (Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§627.429(4)(b),
641.3007(4)(b) (West Supp. 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-16 (1989) IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 505.16 (West Supp. 1992).
87. McMartin, supra note 14, at 8. California appears to be the only state that requires
this. CAL. INS. CODE § 799.04 (West Supp. 1992).
88. McMartin, supra note 14, at 8-9. See CAL. INS. CODE § 799.06 (West Supp. 1992).
89. McMartin, supra note 14, at 9-10.
90. CAL. INS. CODE § 799.03(b) (West Supp. 1992); COLO. REv. STAT. § 10-3-1104.5(5)
(1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627.429(4)(c), 641.3007(4)(c) (West 1989); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 191.671(5) (1990); TEx INS. CODE ANN. § 21.21-4(0 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE § 7024.325
(West Supp. 1991).
91. McMartin, supra note 14, at 10.
92. McMartin, supra note 14, at 9. Many such provisions are modeled after the NAIC
Model Bulletin which aims to prevent discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. For
specific statutes see CAL. INS. CODE § 799.05 (West Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-
1104(f)(VI), (VII), (VIII) (1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-230 (Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 641.3007(4)(d) (West Supp. 1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-013(5)(c) (Baldwin Supp.
1990); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3901.45 (Anderson 1990).
93. McMartin, supra note 14, at 9.
termine the applicant's sexual orientation, race, and other characteristics.
Despite the variety of regulations dealing with the use of HIV test-
ing, a number of cases demonstrate the problems created by even the
strictest statutory approaches.
A. Confidentiality Problems
Perhaps the most serious problems with testing are violations of ap-
plicants' confidentiality. Despite regulations specifically preventing non-
consensual revelation of HIV status, several breaches have been reported.
In John Doe v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America,94 the plaintiff, a life
insurance applicant who was denied coverage due to a positive HIV test,
alleged that the insurance company violated confidentiality regulations
by publicizing his positive test result at a company event, which resulted
in severe personal consequences. 95 Although the case settled out of
court, it is a good example of an insurer's disregard for state confidential-
ity regulations.
In 1990, the first suit alleging violation of the confidentiality section
of the California Insurance Code was filed.96 In Doe v. Knights of Co-
lumbus Insurance Co. ,9 the plaintiff alleged that after the company per-
formed the HIV test, it allegedly violated section 799.03 of the California
Insurance Code by sending the results directly to her home instead of to
her doctor.98
Breaches in confidentiality can lead to serious personal and profes-
sional consequences for the unsuspecting applicant. Such cases, happen-
ing even in states with strong regulation, call into question the adequacy
of current statutory protection.
As the insurance industry continues its challenge of current statutes,
many states are loosening HIV testing restrictions.99 This trend, coupled
with an increase in abuse allegations, raises the issue of whether current
state statutory measures are adequate to protect the rights of individual
applicants. Job security, education, and even child custody may be jeop-
94. John Doe v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 87-CIV-2040 (D.N.Y. 1987).
95. Kim & McMullin, supra note 4, at 170; Mark Scherzer, Insurance, in AIDS LEGAL
GuIDE §§ 5-1, 5-3 (Abby R. Rubenfeld ed., 2d ed. 1987).
96. Peters, supra note 13, at 1. Section 799.03 of the Code outlines California's rules on
informed consent, privacy protections, and notification of results. CAL. INS. CODE § 799.03
(West Supp. 1990).
97. Peters, supra note 13, at 1; Doe v. Knights of Columbus Ins. Co., SCV-182566.
98. See Peters, supra note 13, at 9. Section 799.03 of the California Insurance Code states,
"No insurer shall test for HIV or for the presence of antibodies to HIV for the purpose of
determining insurability other than in accordance with the informed consent, counseling, and
privacy protection provisions of this article .... (b) The insurer shall notify an applicant of a
positive test result by notifying the applicant's designated physician." CAL. INS. CODE
§ 799.03 (West Supp. 1992).
99. David K. Nelson, AIDS and Life Insurance: A Last(?) Look at Testing Prohibitions, 4
AIDS & PUB. POL'Y J. 171, 171 (1989).
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ardized by public disclosure of HIV results.1"° Raising constitutional
protections as a way to limit an insurer's use of testing has been sug-
gested as one possible solution. 101
III. Constitutional Protections
A. State Action
Whenever a plaintiff brings a suit alleging violation of constitutional
rights by a private individual or individuals, there must be a determina-
tion of whether the defendant's actions constitute state action. 10 2 If a
court determines that the defendant had sufficient connection to the gov-
ernment, it will proceed to consider the alleged violations. Without suffi-
cient contacts, there is no basis for the plaintiff to bring the suit, since the
Court will not hold the actions of purely private actors to be constitu-
tional violations. 1 3
The Supreme Court has taken several different approaches in deter-
mining if state action is present."° If state legislation commands the ac-
tivity that violated the plaintiff's rights, state action always exists.10 5 The
same is true if the legislation encourages the activity to such a degree that
the practice is inevitable. 06
Another, often overlapping, basis for state action centers on the rela-
tionship between the private actor and the government. This includes
cases where the private actor is subject to extensive regulation by the
government. 0 7 Along with a consideration of the degree of regulation,
the Supreme Court has focused on whether the regulation commanded,
encouraged, or sanctioned the constitutional violations.'08 The opinions
of the Court suggest that state action will be found if the state compels or
100. See infra notes 252-59 and accompanying text.
101. See generally Edward E. Hollowell & James E. Eldridge, Constitutional Law: Sub-
stance, Equal Opportunity, and the Individual Diagnosed with HIV, 9 J. LEGAL. MED. 561
(1988); Donna Costa, Note, Reportability of Exposure to the AIDS Virus: An Equal Protection
Analysis, 7 CARDOZO L. REv. 1103 (1986).
102. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12.1, at 452
(4th ed. 1991).
103. Id. at 453-54.
104. Id. § 12.2-12.4, at 457-77. The three main approaches are public function, state com-
mandment or encouragement of private activities, and mutual contacts. Id. Since supplying
insurance is not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state, the insurance industry does
not meet the public function test. Anne C. Cicero, Note, Strategies for the Elimination of Sex
Discrimination in Private Insurance, 20 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 211, 242 (1985). Therefore,
this discussion of state action will focus on the other two approaches.
105. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 102, at 464.
106. Id. This type of encouragement can also occur by the state acting through its officers
or agents, including the judiciary. Id. at 464-65.
107. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 102, § 12.4, at 470.
108. Id. at 471-73.
significantly encourages the conduct in some way."
A recent Supreme Court case may provide an inroad into finding
state encouragement in insurance testing situations.110 In Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives'Ass'n, railway labor organizations sued on
Fourth Amendment grounds to block regulations which permitted drug
testing." 2 Federal railroad regulations mandated drug testing for em-
ployees of private railroads after certain types of accidents.' 13 The regu-
lations also authorized, but did not require, private railroads to
administer drug tests to employees who violated certain safety rules.1 14
The Court stated that determining whether a private party could be
considered a government agent turns on the degree of government's par-
ticipation in the private party's activities.115 "The fact that the Govern-
ment has not compelled a private party to perform a search [by drug
testing employees] does not by itself, establish that the search is a private
one. Here, specific features of the regulations combine to convince us
that the Government did more than adopt a passive position toward the
underlying private cohduct." '116 These regulatory features included: pre-
empting state laws, rules, or regulations covering the area; 117 giving the
Federal Railroad Agency the right to receive test results;118 and prevent-
ing the railroad from divesting itself of authority under the statute.119
The Court found such evidence to be "clear indices of the Government's
encouragement, endorsement, and participation, and suffice to implicate
the Fourth Amendment." 120
The regulatory features of many states' insurance codes contain sim-
ilar elements to those in Skinner. Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
109. Henry C. Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court, 18 HAs-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 587, 620 (1991). See Peterson v. Greenville, 873 U.S. 244 (1963); Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
110. Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to find state action by private insurance
companies. See, eg., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 356-59 (1974) (denial
of due process by highly regulated public utility not state action because of the lack of the
violation's connection with legislation). Using the approach in Jackson, several courts have
held that mere approval of policies by insurance commissioners did not rise to the level of state
action. See, e.g., Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1298, 1312 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), rev'd on other grounds, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149 (1978); Murphy v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 422 A.2d 1097 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980),
cerL denied, 454 U.S. 896 (1981).
111. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
112. Id. at 612.
113. Id. at 609.
114. Id. at 611.
115. Id. at 614.




120. Id. at 615-16.
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states have exclusive jurisdiction over insurance companies. As dis-
cussed, state regulation of insurers is extensive in every state.1 21 Insur-
ance codes often list the situations where testing is prohibited and detail
the narrow areas where it is permitted. Legislation may also establish
what questions applicants can be asked, the type of consent required,
discrimination to be avoided, and other detailed rules.122 In addition,
some states require private insurance companies to relay test results to
state health agencies. 12
3
The language in Stern v. Massachusetts Indemnity & Life Insurance
Co. 124 supports this approach to finding state action. 125 In Stem, the
plaintiff argued a civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a claim
requiring state action. The court reviewed the extensive regulations and
role of insurance commissioners in controlling the industry.126 It con-
cluded "[iun light of the pervasive regulatory scheme extant here, we find
that the allegations of the Complaint sufficiently set forth the require-
ment of state action." 127 One commentator has interpreted this to mean
that state action can be established if the plaintiff is challenging a rating
or underwriting scheme that is an integral part of the business of insur-
ance and the insurance commission held rate hearings regarding cover-
age.1 28 This would arguably be the situation if applicants challenged the
aspect of underwriting requiring HIV testing.
State action is an unsettled area of law, especially in the area of reg-
ulatory involvement. 129 Although restrictions on state action have been
tightened in recent years, 30 the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated the
necessity for resolving this question on a case-by-case basis. 131 Given a
situation involving extensive regulation and management by state agen-
cies, with a serious violation of constitutional rights, the court may be
121. Robert Nesslerroth, State Discrimination in Automotive Insurance, 39 FED'N INS. &
CORP. COUNS. Q. 141, 164 (1989).
122. See supra notes 69-93 and accompanying text.
123. McMartin, supra note 14, at 10. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 191.671(5) (1990); TEX. INS.
CODE ANN. § 21.21-4(t) (West 1990); 1989 Wash. Legis. Serv. 387 § l(c)(iil) (West).
124. 365 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
125. Id at 438.
126. Id
127. Id. at 439. But see Life Ins. Co. of North Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir.
1979) (finding no state action under similar facts).
128. Cicero, supra note 104, at 243-44. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Baerwalat, 593 F.
Supp. 39,42 (W.D. Mich. 1984) (holding insurance commissioner's actions in ordering insurer
to cease and desist certain marketing practices constituted state action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983).
129. Strickland, supra note 109, at 620. Strickland notes that no recent case has been de-
cided on this basis. Id.
130. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Kendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830
(1982).
131. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 102, at 463-64. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
willing to find state action. 32
The future of health and life insurance may render state action ques-
tions moot. With the adoption of national or state health insurance,133
the government essentially will become the provider of insurance. As a
result, its actions towards testing could be challenged under state or fed-
eral constitutions.1 34
B. Right to Privacy
One major area influenced by HIV testing for insurance purposes is
the right of individual privacy. HIV-positive individuals often face wide-
spread discrimination, sometimes resulting in loss of jobs, eviction, and
loss of child custody.13 ' The damage of breaching confidentiality goes
beyond the individual's right to privacy. Experts believe that finding an
AIDS cure depends upon keeping accurate public health records.1 36 As
the public learns of the potential risks in being tested, it is less likely to
submit to voluntary testing. Individuals' hesitancy to be tested could de-
lay needed medical attention, as well as contribute to the continued
spread of the virus.137 Even insurers have recognized the interest in pro-
tecting the confidentiality of an individual's HIV status.1 38 Due to these
concerns, constitutional protection of privacy is one potential way to pro-
tect confidentiality.1 39
The concept of privacy is rooted in the Supreme Court's interpreta-
132. Cicero, supra note 104, at 244. Another option to finding state action is to look to
state courts. Some state courts, such as California, have held that state action may not always
be required under the State constitution. See Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel.
595 P.2d 592, 597-98 (Cal. 1979) (holding California's equal protection applied to actions of
private utility); Hill v. NCAA, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402, 407-08, (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
California's right of privacy reached both nongovernmental and governmental conduct). In
addition, some states have less demanding tests for state action, even in the insurance area. See
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 482 A.2d 542 (Pa. 1984) (finding
gender-based insurance rates violated the state's equal rights amendment); Hathaway v. Com-
missioner of Ins., 399 N.E.2d 862 (Mass. 1980) (finding insurance regulatory scheme suffi-
ciently comprehensive to qualify as state action); Pennsylvania Chiropractic Fed'n v. Foster,
583 A.2d 844 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (holding insurance regulations requiring insurers to
contract with peer review organization constituted state action).
133. Spencer Rich, Bush Accused of Health Care 'Cynicism'--Hill Democrats Cite Delay in
Sending Up Detailed Reform Measure, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 1991, at A4.
134. Stephen R. Ryan, The Elimination of Gender Discrimination in Insurance Pricing:
Does Automobile Insurance Rate Without Sex?, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 748, 773 (1986).
135. John R. Dunne & Gregory V. Serio, Confidentiality: An Integral Component of AIDS
Public Policy, 7 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. Rv. 25 (1988). See infra notes 252-59.
136. Dunne & Serio, supra note 135, at 30-31.
137. Mark Barnes, Confidentiality, in AIDS LEGAL GUIDE § 4-1 (Abby R. Rubenfeld ed.,
2d ed. 1987).
138. NAIC proposals suggest steps the industry could take to help prevent disclosure.
Joyce Nixson Hoffman & Elizabeth Zieser Kincaid, AIDS: The Challenge to Life and Health
Insurers' Freedom of Contract, 35 DRAKE L. Rnv. 709, 732-35 (1986).
139. Dunne & Serio, supra note 135, at 28.
Summer 19921 HIV TESTING
1178 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 19:1163
tion of the Bill of Rights, especially the First, 1" Third, '41 Fourth, 142
Fifth, 4 ' and Ninth Amendment"4 guarantees.145 Original concerns re-
garding search and seizure issues 146 were expanded to protect "people
not places." 147 The Court subsequently used privacy to protect the use
of contraceptives,1 48 the limited right to abortion, 49 and the right to
marriage. 5 ' These examples illustrate the Court's traditional interpreta-
tion of privacy, which can be stated as "the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions."''
Recently, the Court expanded privacy to include "the individual in-
terest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters."' 52 This expansion was
seen as a response to concern over unwarranted disclosure of private in-
formation caused by advancements in computer technology and informa-
tion gathering.'53 The newer concept of constitutional privacy is more
akin to confidentiality. Commentators refer to this type of privacy right
as "informational privacy."
140. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
141. "No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of
the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." U.S. CONST. amend.
III.
142. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause.... ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
143. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONsr. amend. V.
144. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
145. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
146. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (invoices sought by police protected by
privacy concerns).
147. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (concerning the wire tapping of a
public phone).
148. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (married person's right to possess and
use contraceptive guaranteed under Constitution); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(extending the right to unmarried persons).
149. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (women's right to legal abortion during first two
trimesters part of her constitutional privacy).
150. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (Virginia's antimiscegenation laws violated indi-
viduals' privacy rights).
151. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
152. Id. at 599.
153. William J. Winslade, Confidentiality of Medical Records, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 497, 518-
19 (1982).
L The Development of Informational Privacy
Since 1977, the Supreme Court has recognized the concept of infor-
mational privacy. The first argument in favor of such protection, made
in Paul v. Davis,"' was unsuccessful. After an arrest for shoplifting, but
prior to trial, the police featured Davis by name and photograph in flyers
distributed to local merchants."' Davis claimed this publication vio-
lated "a right to privacy guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth,
and Fourteenth Amendments."1 56
After consideration, the Supreme Court rejected this claim, holding
that although the Constitution created certain "zones of privacy," ' 7
Davis' case did not fall within any of these "zones." More specifically,
the Court stated that privacy rights should be limited to those "implicit
to the concept of ordered liberty." ' 8 Since Davis' claim was not one of
the explicit fundamental rights, his case was decided using rational rela-
tionship standards.
Despite the Court's refusal to recognize informational privacy in
Davis, it re-addressed the issue the next year, in the landmark case
Whalen v. Roe.'5 9 In Whalen, the Supreme Court examined a New York
statute mandating the recording of names and addresses of all those who
had used a doctor's prescription to obtain any of a select list of drugs that
had been chosen for their potential illegal use. 6° First, the Court con-
cluded that the state had a legitimate purpose in requiring the record
keeping. This interest fell under the rubric of "controlling the distribu-
tion of dangerous drugs."' 61 Then, the Court turned to the appellees'
claim that the statute violated constitutionally protected zones of pri-
vacy. Unlike Davis, the Court in Whalen acknowledged the existence of
"at least two different kinds of [privacy] interests."' 62 In the case at bar,
the interest was "in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,"1 63 rather
than "in making certain kinds of important decisions."' 64 In differentiat-
ing between these two interests, the Court acknowledged, for the first
time, the right to informational privacy as a fundamental privacy right
under the Constitution.165
Despite this recognition, after carefully reviewing the statutory safe-
154. 424 U.S. 693, 697 (1976).
155. Id. at 695-96.
156. Id. at 712.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 713 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
159. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
160. Id. at 591.
161. Id. at 598.
162. Id. at 599-600.
163. Id. at 599.
164. Id. at 599-600.
165. Id. at 599-600, 605.
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guards, the Court upheld the New York statute. 1 6 6 In approving the
statute's protective measures, the Court stated, "[t]he right to collect and
use such data.., is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or
regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures."1 67
The recognition of informational privacy in Whalen left many unan-
swered questions. The Court failed to identify which constitutional pro-
visions supported recognition of this right. 168  Whalen also failed to
clearly articulate what type of standard should be used when measuring
the new right against asserted state interests. 169 As a substantive due
process right, privacy has been considered "fundamental." 170 In cases
where privacy is asserted, the Court uses a strict scrutiny analysis in re-
viewing the statute abridging the privacy right.17' Strict scrutiny re-
quires that for the legislation to stand the state interest must be
compelling and the statute must be narrowly tailored."7 2 If these require-
ments are not met, the legislation will be declared unconstitutional.
Despite gaps in Whalen, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its recogni-
tion of informational privacy in Nixon v. Administrator of General Serv-
ices.'73  Here, President Richard Nixon claimed his right to
informational privacy had been violated by a congressional act authoriz-
ing review of Presidential materials for archival purposes. 7 4 Citing
Whalen, the Court recognized the President's privacy interest 75 and
then used a balancing test-weighing the state's possible intrusion into
individual privacy against the statutory purpose and the state's interest in
collecting the information. 17 6 The Court concluded that the feared intru-
sion was minimal and did not outweigh the state interest in preserving
historical documents. 77
166. Id. at 600-02.
167. Id. at 605.
168. Id. at 599 n.24. The Court cited an article by Prof. Kurland (See Philip B. Kurland,
The Private I, U. CHI. MAG., Autumn 1976, at 8. Kurland identifies three main spheres of
privacy, of which informational privacy is one).
169. Gretta J. Heaney, Note, The Constitutional Right of Informational Privacy: Does it
Protect Children Suffering From AIDS?, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 927, 936 (1986). But see
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600-05, where the Court details the statutory protections and state
interests.
170. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 102, at 393.
171. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 102, at 371, 388. See NAACP v. Alabama, 377
U.S. 288, 307 (1964) (abridgement of fundamental rights must not be achieved by means which
invade the protected freedom).
172. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-22 (2d ed. 1988); No-
WAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 102, at 371.
173. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
174. Id. at 429, 457-58.
175. Id. at 458.
176. Id. at 458-59, 467-68.
177. See Whalen, 429 U.S. 589, 600-05 (using a similar approach).
2. Informational Privacy-A Mixed Outcome
As in many new areas of law, the confusion over informational pri-
vacy has led to a mix of lower court decisions. T17  The main split has been
between courts following Paul v. Davis,179 in which the Supreme Court
failed to recognize information privacy as warranting anything more
than mere rational relationship analysis, and those following Whalen and
Nixon, in which the Court recognized a privacy right and balanced it
against the relevant state interest."' 0
Several circuit courts have interpreted Whalen as requiring an inter-
mediate level of scrutiny in informational privacy cases.""1 The Fifth
Circuit, in Plante v. Gonzalez," 2 held that a state constitutional amend-
ment requiring financial disclosure by public officials warranted a balanc-
ing test.18 3 The court balanced the state's interest in ensuring public
officials' fiscal responsibility against the individuals' interest in nondisclo-
sure. It concluded that the state interest was greater.18 4
The Third Circuit, in United States v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp.,1 85 showed its willingness to award informational privacy rights
greater scrutiny."8 6 In Westinghouse, the National Institute for Occupa-
tional Safety and Health (NIOSH) requested access to health records of
Westinghouse employees. Westinghouse refused, raising the employees'
privacy interests in their records. The appellate court noted that the em-
ployees had a privacy interest in their medical information,18 7 but, none-
178. Heaney, supra note 169, at 938-42; Bruce W. Clark, Note, The ConstitutionalRight o
Confidentiality, 51 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 133, 139-42 (1982).
179. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
180. One article characterizes the standard used in Whalen as "one which focuses on a
consideration and balance of public and private interests in legislation." The same author
concludes that the Court did not apply either a rational basis test or a strict scrutiny analysis to
the legislation, but something in between. Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional
Protection ofInformational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REv. 133, 146 (1991). This intermediate stan-
dard is similar to the standard adopted by the Court in equal protection cases dealing with
gender or illegitimacy. Under the intermediate standard, the Court will uphold the legislation
only if the government can show a substantial relationship to an important state interest. No-
WAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 102, at 371. Although the Court has not formally adopted this
new standard for substantive due process cases, it appears to be employing it anyway. NOWAK
& ROTUNDA, supra note 102, at 371.
181. Chlapowski, supra note 180, at 146-47.
182. 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
183. Id. "[S]crutiny is necessary. The Supreme Court has clearly recognized that the pri-
vacy of one's personal affairs is protected by the Constitution. Something more than mere
rationality must be demonstrated." Id at 1134.
184. Id. at 1134-37.
185. 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
186. Id. at 577-81.
187. Id. at 572-73. "There can be no question that an employee's medical records, which
may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials entitled
to privacy protection." Id. at 577.
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theless, upheld NIOSH's statutory right to access.
In reaching its decision, the Westinghouse court balanced the follow-
ing factors: (1) the type of medical record requested, (2) the information
the record possibly contained, (3) the potential for harm from any non-
consensual disclosure, (4) injury to the patient from a nonconsensual dis-
closure, (5) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent disclosure, (6) the
degree of need to access, and (7) the existence, or nonexistence, of an
express statute or clear public interest supporting access. s8  Ultimately,
the court relied on the strict safeguards and limited access built into the
statute. Several other courts have followed similar approaches.'8 9
Some appellate courts have proved reluctant to accord the concept
of informational privacy with anything more than rational basis scrutiny.
Like Paul v. Davis, these cases question the right of individuals to protect
information about themselves. The Seventh Circuit, in McElrath v.
Califano, 9 ° narrowly interpreted privacy rights. The plaintiffs, welfare
applicants, claimed their privacy interests were violated by mandatory
disclosure of social security numbers to the Illinois Department of Public
Aid, required for eligibility to collect welfare payments. 191 The court
avoided considering the issue of informational privacy by finding that
"the contention that disclosure of one's social security account number
violates the right to privacy has been consistently rejected in other re-
lated contexts."' 192 This finding was supported by the court's holding
that "'[w]elfare benefits are not a fundamental right.' "
Again, the Sixth Circuit in J.P. v. DeSanti,'94 held that the right to
privacy did not extend to a right to nondisclosure of personal informa-
tion. 95 The DeSanti court explicitly relied on Paul v. Davis96 in re-
jecting juvenile plaintiffs' claim that dissemination of social histories
violated their constitutional rights. 197
188. Id. at 578. In using this approach, the court expanded on the Whalen/Nixon balanc-
ing approach.
189. Chlapowski, supra note 180, at 148 n. 110. See Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d
1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983); Schacter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1978); Plowman v.
United States Dep't of Army, 698 F. Supp. 627, 633 (E.D. Va. 1988); Woods v. White, 689 F.
Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1988); Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Ctr., 667 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.
Iowa 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1096 (1989); Slevin v. City of New York, 551 F. Supp. 917,
930-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd in part and rev'd in part, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983);
Hawaii Psychiatric Soc'y v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1037, 1045 (D. Haw. 1979).
190. 615 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1980).
191. Id. at 435-36.
192. Id. at 441.
193. Id. (quoting Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 584 n.9 (1976)).
194. 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981).
195. Id. at 1090. "For all of the foregoing reasons we conclude that the Constitution does
not encompass a general right to nondisclosure of private information." Id.
196. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
197. 653 F.2d at 1090-91.
Despite this split over the application of informational privacy and
the breadth of its protection, a majority of cases have concluded that
Whalen held the right to privacy included the concept of informational
privacy. 198 These courts have generally used an intermediate form of
scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny or rational relationship.1 99 In apply-
ing this middle scrutiny, courts have balanced state interests against in-
terests in informational privacy.
3. Application of Informational Privacy Protections to HIV Testing
Despite the uncertainties remaining regarding informational pri-
vacy, there is precedent for applying the concept to HIV-testing informa-
tion. The Court, in Whalen, acknowledged the potential cost to
individuals upon disclosure of medical information which, "may reflect
unfavorably on the character of the patient." 2' It was this type of dis-
closure that the Court considered in making its decision. Nonconsensual
disclosure of HIV status would certainly have a negative impact on an
applicant's reputation.20'
Given the potential for severe and irreparable harm to the applicant,
the outcome of a balancing test might invalidate current legislation. The
balancing test would weigh competing state and individual interests.
Factors of special importance, detailed in Westinghouse, would be the
type of medical information requested and the harm from nonconsensual
disclosure.202 The state's interest in legislation permitting testing by pri-
vate insurers may be, arguably, a combination of protection of public
health and promotion of insurance availability.
Protection of public health traditionally has been considered a com-
pelling state interest.2 °3 In Whalen, the Court held the state interest in
controlling the distribution of drugs, by monitoring those who had been
given prescriptions, permissible.2' The state interest in Westinghouse, to
conduct health-hazard evaluations on occupational safety, was also per-
mitted by the Court.20 5 Providing private insurers with access to indi-
viduals' HIV status is farther removed from public health goals. Thus, in
weighing the state's interest, the court carefully should distinguish the
198. Chlapowski, supra note 180, at 149. But see J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th
Cir. 1981).
199. Chlapowski, supra note 180, at 149. See the balancing test in Nixon v. Administrator
of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 458 (1977).
200. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977).
201. See Jeff Glenney, Note, AIDS: A Crisis in Confidentiality, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1702,
1714-15 (1989). See infra part III. C.l.b.
202. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980). See
infra part III.C.l.b.
203. See Glenney, supra note 201, at 1711.
204. 429 U.S. at 598.
205. 638 F.2d at 577-78. The inspection in Westinghouse was prompted by a written re-
quest for inspection made by an authorized union representative.
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HIV testing situation from more traditional situations and treat it
accordingly.
The interest of the individual in informational privacy is especially
acute in HIV testing situations. Given the inadequacy of safeguards, the
likelihood of disclosure is relatively high. Additionally, with the nature
of the medical information, the resulting harm can be devastating. 2"
Thus, individual privacy rights are more persuasive in an HIV testing
situation.207
When courts have used this balancing approach they have been very
careful to note the statutory measures protecting against disclosure.2 "8
In considering various states' legislation regarding HIV testing, the type
of statutory safeguards present in Whalen and Westinghouse are fre-
quently absent, especially in states with no restrictions on testing. This
could be an important factor in encouraging courts to find current legis-
lation unconstitutional.
The right of informational privacy, although relatively new and un-
developed, is likely to expand in future years, especially with the develop-
ments in computerized record keeping. HIV testing is one area that may
be challenged under this new concept.
C. Equal Protection
Equal protection provides another potential constitutional source of
protection for insurance applicants. The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state shall make or enforce
any law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."20 9 To invoke equal protection, a party
must be part of a "suspect class,"'210 or have a "fundamental right" in-
fringed.211 Once a court determines that equal protection is applicable, it
reviews the case using one of three tests.21 2 If the Court can find no basis
for independent evaluation, such as a suspect class or fundamental right,
it applies the rational basis test.21 3 Under this standard, the legislation
need only have a reasonable, rational, or fair relationship to a legitimate
public purpose or governmental interest.2" 4 Mere rationality results in a
great deal of deference to states' interests,215 and rarely results in judicial
206. See infra notes 252-59 and accompanying text.
207. Dunne & Serio, supra note 135, at 30-31.
208. See supra notes 159-67 and accompanying text.
209. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
210. TRIBE, supra note 172, § 16-13.
211. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 102, § 14.3.
212. Id. § 14.3, at 574.
213. Id. at 579.
214. Id. at 599. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
215. Costa, supra note 101, at 1115.
intervention.216 In cases where the government uses a suspect classifica-
tion or denies a fundamental right, the Court applies the strict scrutiny
test.217 To survive this test there must be a showing that the legislation is
narrowly tailored and promotes a compelling governmental interest.218
In addition to strict scrutiny and mere rationality, the Court has
developed an intermediate level of review for use with "sensitive" or
"quasi-suspect" classes and "important," but not fundamental, rights.2 19
When dealing with these classifications, "heightened" or "intermediate"
scrutiny requires that the legislation be substantially related to an impor-
tant governmental interest.22°
1. Applying Suspect or Quasi-Suspect Classification to Insurance
Applicants
Using equal protection as a method to protect insurance applicants
could take one of two approaches. One approach would be to treat HIV-
positive persons as part of a suspect or quasi-suspect class.221 Another
option would be to argue that applicants' fundamental rights, such as the
interest in informational privacy, are infringed by state-sanctioned test-
ing.222 Either alternative would arguably invoke constitutional protec-
tion and stricter scrutiny.
Applying protected class status involves proving a history of dis-
crimination, stigmatization, immutability of the characteristic common
to the class, and political powerlessness. 223 If a court finds these factors
sufficient to consider the group a suspect class, strict scrutiny must be
used in reviewing legislation which relates to the class. To date, only a
few groups, including race, religion, and alienage, have qualified for such
protection.224
Other groups have qualified for heightened scrutiny protection as
quasi-suspect classes, including gender,225  alienage, 226 and illegiti-
216. William F. Flanagan, Equality Rights for People with AIDS Mandatory Reporting of
HIV Infection and Contact Tracing, 34 MCGILL L.J. 530, 561 (1989).
217. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 102, at 579.
218. Id.
219. Id at 576.
220. Id See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Mills v.
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("[C]lassifieations...
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achieve-
ment of those objectives.").
221. Barnes, supra note 137, § 4-4.
222. Id
223. TRIBE, supra note 172, § 16-22.
224. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
225. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
226. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
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macy.22 7 The difference between suspect and quasi-suspect classification
is unclear.228  Cases dealing with quasi-suspect classifications overlap
greatly with traditional suspect class characteristics. Factors such as
"discrete and insular minorit[y]" status, 22 9 stereotypes, stigmatization,
immutability, and historical treatment, have all been cited as support for
quasi-suspect classification.230
To use a class approach for analyzing insurance regulations, appli-
cants could be included as part of a broader suspect or quasi-suspect
class, or one limited to applicants. Arguably, the focus of this approach
would concentrate on HIV-positive applicants whose privacy and welfare
are most at risk.
a. Using Sexual Orientation, Intravenous Drug Use, and Physical
Handicap as Protected Classes
Including applicants in a broader class requires finding a group
which meets the court's classification requirements. One possibility is a
class determined by sexual orientation.231 Since the majority of people in
the United States with AIDS are gay men,232 and AIDS discrimination
often reflects anti-gay sentiment, this approach would make logical
sense.
233
Arguably, sexual orientation could meet the four traditional criteria
needed for a suspect class.234 Courts have generally refused, however, to
treat homosexuals as members of a suspect class.235 The only court to
227. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976);
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
228. TRIBE, supra note 172, § 16-33, at 1614 ("The Court has never provided a coherent
explanation of the characteristics which, either overtly or covertly, trigger intermediate
review.").
229. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
230. TRIBE, supra note 172, § 16-33, at 1614-16.
231. See Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Sus-
pect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1985); Harris M. Miller, Note, An Argument for
the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexu-
ality, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 797 (1984).
232. Overall, 58% of all men with AIDS contracted the disease through sex with other
men. This rate is much higher for Asian and white men (76% and 75%), than for Black and
Hispanic men (35% and 40%). CDC, supra note 3, at 8, 9. An argument can also be made
that dissemination of HIV status reveals a person's sexual orientation.
233. Barnes, supra note 137, § 4-4.
234. "As subjects of age-old discrimination and disapproval, homosexuals form virtually a
discrete and insular minority. Their sexual orientation is in all likelihood 'a characteristic
determined by causes not within [their] control,' and is, if not immutable, at least 'extremely
difficult to alter' .... Homosexuality should thus be added-and openly-to the list of classifi-
cations that trigger increased judicial solicitude." TRIBE, supra note 172, § 16-33, at 1616.
235. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989); Woodward v. United States,
871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); Padula v. Webster,
822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987); National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270,
1273 (10th Cir. 1984), afl'd by an equally divided Court 470 U.S. 903 (1985).
consider homosexuality as a suspect classification has been the Ninth
Circuit. In Watkins v. United States Army,2" 6 the court found that
homosexuals constituted a suspect class under equal protection jurispru-
dence.23 After analyzing the history of discrimination, unfairness of dis-
crimination in relation to societal contribution, immutability, and lack of
political power,23 the court held, "our analysis of the relevant factors...
ineluctably leads us to the conclusion that homosexuals constitute such a
suspect class. ' 239 After this finding, the court applied strict scrutiny to
the Army regulations which facially discriminated against gay men and
lesbians.2'
Despite this step to expand equal protection, only two years later the
same court overturned the district court decision in High Tech Gays v.
Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office,241 which had also held
homosexuals a suspect class. The court relied heavily on the Supreme
Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.242 Thus, given the current judi-
cial atmosphere, it is unlikely that gay men and lesbians will receive even
heightened scrutiny protection in the near future.
Another, similar, approach would include HIV-positive individuals
with other protected groups. Proposed classes include intravenous drug
users and prostitutes.243 These groups are unlikely to obtain status as a
suspect or quasi-suspect class, however, due to the element of choice in-
volved which arguably defeats the immutability requirement.2'
Potentially the most promising approach includes HIV-positive ap-
plicants as part of a handicapped class.24 Despite classification as handi-
236. 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn, 875 F.2d 699 (1989) (en banc).
237. Id. at 1349.
238. Id. at 1345-49.
239. Id. at 1349.
240. Id. 1349-50.
241. 668 F.Supp. 1361 (M.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
242. Hank Pearson, High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office" Re-
considering Suspect Status for Homosexuals, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 871, 875 (1991); Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding sodomy laws as they applied to homosexuals).
243. Barnes, supra note 137, § 4-4.
244. Id.; see New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (holding that
refusal to hire person undergoing methadone maintenance treatment for heroin addiction was
not a violation of Title VII, despite significant evidence of adverse impact on minority groups).
245. See Hollowell & Eldridge, supra note 101. Precedent exists for covering contagious
diseases, such as AIDS, under disabled status. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 280-86
(1987) (a teacher suffering from tuberculosis may be considered a "handicapped individual"
under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973). Notably, several lower courts have held that
people with AIDS fall under the protection of § 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act. See
Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701, 704-09 (9th Cir. 1988) (HIV-positive teacher
covered by § 504); Martinez v. School Bd., 861 F.2d 1502, 1506 (1Ith Cir. 1988) (HIV-positive
child challenging educational segregation covered under § 504); Casey v. Lewis, 773 F. Supp.
1365, 1370-72 (D. Ariz. 1991) (HIV-positive prisoners challenging restriction of visits covered
under § 504); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1986)
(child with AIDS handicapped for purposes of § 504).
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capped individuals under federal statutes, equal protection does not
necessarily follow. The Supreme Court recently held that mentally re-
tarded people are not a quasi-suspect class and are not entitled to height-
ened scrutiny. 246 Despite the presence of characteristics similar to those
of existing suspect and quasi-suspect classes, the Court was concerned
about extending the protection to a potentially unending series of new
classes.2 47 The Court's reluctance to extend suspect and quasi-suspect
classifications bodes poorly for further expansion.
b. HIV Status as an Independent Suspect or Quasi-Suspect Class
Given the probable difficulty of expanding a base class to include
HIV-positive applicants, an alternative method is to treat HIV status as
its own class.248 The emergence of AIDS has undoubtedly produced a
"discrete and singular minority."249 This group, while perhaps not quali-
fying as a suspect class, may qualify as a sensitive or quasi-suspect class
warranting heightened scrutiny.250
HIV-positive individuals possess many, if not all, of the criteria out-
lined by the Court: discrimination, stigmatization, immutability, and
political powerlessness.25'
Ample evidence exists of discrimination against AIDS victims since
the emergence of the syndrome.252 Public fear about AIDS has resulted
in employment discrimination,253 educational discrimination,254 housing
discrimination,255 denial or curtailment of insurance,25  and denial of
246. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). But see Doe v. Roe,
526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 725 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (discussing need for heightened scrutiny where
AIDS testing is at issue).
247. "[I]f the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed quasi-sus-
pect... it would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups
who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot themselves
mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at
least part of the public at large. One need mention in this respect only the aging, the disabled,
the mentally ill, and the infirm." 473 U.S. 432, 445-46.
248. See Costa, supra note 101, at 1115.
249. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minori-
ties, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.").
250. Costa, supra note 101, at 1119.
251. See supra note 223 and accompanying text for more detailed discussion of these
criteria.
252. Costa, supra note 101, at 1119 n.117 (citing incidents where policemen refused to
drive prisoner with AIDS to hospital; a doctor with AIDS patients was threatened with evic-
tion; Haitians were denied jobs because of the association with AIDS; funeral director's associ-
ation urged members not to embalm those who died of AIDS).
253. See Arthur S. Leonard, Employment Discrimination Against Persons with AIDS, 10 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 681 (1985).
254. See Amy Tarr, AIDS: The Legal Issues Widen, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 25, 1985, at 29.
255. Doctor Treating AIDS Gets Writ Against Eviction, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 17, 1983, at 1.
medical treatment.257 Even courts have acknowledged that victims of
AIDS "have been faced with social censure, embarrassment, and dis-
crimination in nearly every phase of their lives." '258 A wide variety of
people all face similar HIV or AIDS related discrimination.259
Stigmatization is another important element in the classification of a
group for constitutional protection. 2 1 One way of determining stigmati-
zation is by the general attitude of society towards the group in ques-
tion.261 Despite widespread attempts at education, the public attitude
towards AIDS is generally one of fear and ignorance.262 Those with
AIDS frequently find themselves ostracized by their communities.263
Immutability is a more ambiguous criteria. By definition, immuta-
ble characteristics are unchangeable. Arguably, AIDS is immutable be-
cause once contacted there is no way for the person to change their HIV-
positive status. Once infected with the HIV virus there is no known
method for combatting the virus.264 In addition, immutability tradition-
ally has not been one of the most critical factors. The Court has found
suspect and sensitive classification despite its absence, notably in respect
to alienage.265
The last major consideration is the political powerlessness of the
group in question. Commentators argue that those with AIDS are at a
distinct disadvantage in accessing political power, both because of the
demographics of AIDS and the nature of the disease itself.266 AIDS is
most prevalent among traditionally disadvantaged groups. Gay men, mi-
norities, the poor, and intravenous drug users compose a disproportion-
ate number of AIDS cases.267 These groups remain outside of the
256. See Tarr, supra note 254, at 28.
257. See Jerry Adler et al., The AIDS Conflict, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 23, 1985, at 20-21.
258. South Fla. Blood Serv. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
259. Costa, supra note 101, at 1119.
260. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 373-76 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
261. Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreward Equal Citizenship
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1, 6 n.25 (1977).
262. Costa, supra note 101, at 1120.
263. Government of Virgin Islands v. Roberts, 756 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.V.I. 1991) ("Dis-
closure of the latter information [HIV status] obviously can have devastating consequences
.... AIDS has engendered such prejudice and apprehension that its diagnosis typically signi-
fies a social death as concrete as the physical one which follows.").
264. See supra note 34-35 for more detailed discussion.
265. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (using heightened scrutiny in considering disadvan-
tageous law for aliens); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny to
aliens). Physical disability is also not always an immutable characteristic, but is arguably suffi-
cient for a heightened classification. See Hollowell & Eldridge, supra note 101.
266. Flanagan, supra note 216, at 562.
267. Fifty-nine percent of AIDS cases involve men who had sex with an infected man, 22%
of AIDS cases involve intravenous drug users. CDC, supra note 3; Thomas C. Quinn, Global
Summer 19921 HIV TESTING
1190 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 19:1163
mainstream political process.2 68 In addition, the costly and debilitating
nature of AIDS leaves patients ill-equipped to fight for political protec-
tion. Given these factors, those infected with AIDS have particular diffi-
culty accessing the political arena.
Even if AIDS fulfills the Court's framework for a quasi-suspect
class, serious obstacles remain. Precedent concerning similarly situated
groups presents a problem. The Supreme Court has refused to extend
suspect or quasi-suspect classification to physically or mentally disabled
individuals.269 This reluctance makes protected classification for HIV in-
dividuals less likely.
Another issue is the close link between homosexual activity and
AIDS.27° Traditional disapproval of homosexuality as violating the
moral code 271 makes protection for homosexuals less likely.
If the Court would be willing to treat HIV status as a quasi-suspect
class, legislation dealing with the subject would warrant a heightened
level of judicial scrutiny. In analyzing statutes, the courts would have to
find a substantial relationship between an important state interest and the
terms of the legislation.272 The state's interest in public health is given
great weight by the court even when dealing with constitutional con-
cerns.273 Testing for insurance purposes is not a traditional public health
consideration and, as existing legislation demonstrates, states have lim-
ited insurance companies' access to testing. In fact, commentators have
argued that allowing insurer testing may even damage public health, due
to people's fears about confidentiality and insurability. 274 Even if a suffi-
cient state interest existed, many less intrusive alternatives may be just as
able to satisfy insurers while protecting applicants.275
Epidemiology of HIVInfections, in THE MEDICAL MANAGEMENT OF AIDS 7-8 (Merle Sande
& Paul Volberding eds., 1990).
268. "The relative political powerlessness of people infected with a contagious and widely
feared disease, particularly when those at the greatest risk of infection are already members of
disadvantaged and disfavored groups (in the U.S., primarily black and Hispanic IV drug users,
and gay men), is also a compelling reason for judicial scrutiny." Flanagan, supra note 216, at
562.
269. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
270. Flanagan, supra note 216, at 563.
271. This disapproval was reflected in the Supreme Court's recent decision to uphold sod-
omy laws. The Court cited the tradition of public condemnation to support its decision. Bow-
ers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
272. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
273. Flanagan, supra note 216, at 562. Several cases have held that health regulations
should not be reviewed even when faced with equal protection claims. See In re Caselli, 204 P.
364 (Mont. 1922); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding ordinance requir-
ing mass public vaccinations). Flanagan questions these cases precedential value given the
changes in knowledge of disease and the expansion of constitutional rights. Flanagan, supra
note 216, at 562 n.126.
274. Barnes, supra note 137, § 4-3.
275. Costa, supra note 101, at 1135.
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c. Fundamental Rights: Informational Privacy and Access to Health
Care
In addition to protecting suspect and quasi-suspect classes, equal
protection also extends to fundamental rights.27 6 Traditionally, these
fundamental rights have included the right to vote,2 77 the right to travel
interstate,2 7 the right to criminal appeal,27 9 and the right to privacy.
28 0
The main right in question with AIDS testing is the right to infor-
mational privacy.28 1 Because this right is relatively new and unsettled,
some critics doubt that courts would apply traditional strict scrutiny
when analyzing an informational privacy claim. Even if strict scrutiny
were not used, informational privacy has been given enough deference by
the Court to warrant heightened scrutiny.2 82
In weighing the right of informational privacy against the state in-
terest in permitting insurer testing, it would be important for the Court
to consider the policy argument that medical records deserve an extra
layer of protection. Due to the often personal nature of the doctor-pa-
tient relationship, medical records often contain uniquely revealing infor-
mation. To foster continued trust in the medical community, it is
especially important to protect these records. This reality has been ac-
knowledged by both federal and state governments, leading to special
statutory treatment of medical information.2 83 This consideration would
give extra support to applicants' informational privacy claims.
Another way to expand equal protection is for courts to treat health
care as a fundamental, or near fundamental, right.2 84 Framing health
care in this way might lead to increased government involvement. In-
creased regulations or state mandated health care might eliminate indi-
vidual policies entirely, thus effectively eliminating HIV testing.
The Court has ruled that medical care for the indigent "is as much
'a basic necessity of life' . . as welfare assistance." '2 8 5 In addition, be-
cause of the cost of health care, traditionally disadvantaged groups bear a
greater burden. This fact may strengthen a claim based on equal protec-
tion.28 6 Insurance plays an important role bridging the gap between
276. TRIBE, supra note 172, § 16-33.
277. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
278. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
279. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
280. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
281. See supra part III.B.
282. Barnes, supra note 137, § 4-4.
283. Costa, supra note 101, at 1127 n.171.
284. Wendy K. Mariner, Access to Health Care and Equal Protection of the Law: The Need
for a New Heightened Scrutiny, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 345 (1986).
285. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 259 (1974) (striking down one
year residential requirement for county paid hospitalization).
286. Scherzer, Insurance & AIDS-Related Issues, supra note 63, ch. VIII, at 12.
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state-funded programs and private payment, providing health care for
many who would otherwise have none.2" 7 Legislation effectively limiting
access to health care by allowing HIV testing by insurers could warrant
heightened or strict scrutiny.
This approach has had little success to date. At least one commen-
tator believes that the Court's reluctance is due to the link between access
to health care and economic class.2"8 Wendy Mariner posits that the
Court is troubled by treating classifications based on wealth as suspect
because such a concept challenges the very nature of our economic sys-
tem.28 9 Therefore, the Court refuses to acknowledge the interdepen-
dency between economic power and health care.2"
D. Procedural Due Process
A third type of constitutional challenge to HIV testing employs the
concept of procedural due process. Procedural due process rights come
from the Fifth Amendment,29 as made applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment entitles a person to
adequate notice when rights or interests to which he or she has a "legiti-
mate claim of entitlement" are deprived.292 Property, employment, repu-
tation, honor, and integrity have all given rise to legitimate procedural
due process claims.293 When the government harms one of these areas
without providing the individual sufficient warning, a case for procedural
due process arises. In AIDS cases, property, employment, and reputa-
tion may all be deprived when HIV status becomes known.2 94 Such
harm is likely to follow an insurers' nonconsensual disclosure of HIV
status. Thus, those applicants who suffered a deprivation of rights, with-
out proper notice, may have a basis for a procedural due process
claim.2 9 5
Determining what procedural protection a person is due requires a
balancing test. In making this determination, a court should consider the
nature of the private interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such
interest through government proceedings, the value of additional safe-
287. As one author wrote, "[w]hile not understating the severity of the AIDS epidemic, we
must assert that... as long as adequate public health and welfare systems are not in place, it
must be a social priority to maintain insurance coverage for a social group which already has
suffered inordinate discrimination." Id.
288. Mariner, supra note 284, at 356. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (women had
no right to funding for elective, nontherapeutic abortions).
289. Mariner, supra note 284, at 355-56.
290. Id.
291. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
292. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
293. Closen et al., supra note 41, at 888.
294. See supra notes 232-43 and accompanying text.
295. Closen et al., supra note 41, at 891.
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guards, and the government's interest, including the administrative bur-
dens that additional procedural requirements would entail.2 96
One case that used procedural due process in an AIDS-related situa-
tion is Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Service.297 In Rasmussen, an
individual who contracted AIDS through a blood transfusion sought in-
formation on blood donors' HIV status from the blood service.29 8 In
denying his claim, the Florida Supreme Court relied mainly on the pri-
vacy rights of the donors, but added an important footnote implicating
procedural due process.2 99 The court stated, "without fully addressing
the issue as it is unnecessary to our decision, we note that because disclo-
sure of the information requested threatens damage to the donors' repu-
tation and other liberty interests, the donors' due process rights are also
implicated." 3" This language implies that procedural due process may
be sufficient to block access to individuals' HIV status without adequate
notice.
Applying procedural due process to HIV testing of insurance appli-
cants could take several forms. First, current legislation could be ex-
amined to determine whether it provides adequate procedural due
process to applicants. The nature of the private interest is great and the
risk of erroneous deprivation due to inadequate state legislation is high.
In addition, the state interest in protecting individuals' privacy rights ar-
guably outweighs any burden from closer state supervision. Since some
legislation provides only minimal safeguards against breaches in confi-
dentiality, chances are great that due process rights might be violated.
Another broader issue is whether procedural due process could be
used to completely block insurers' access to HIV testing. If the insurer
was seeking information from pre-existing medical information, the situ-
ation would be analogous to Rasmussen, where the court denied access.
The issue becomes more complex when the applicant voluntarily submits
to an HIV test in order to obtain insurance. In this case, there may not
be enough state action to make a procedural due process claim.
Since many of the confidentiality breaches occur from inadequate or
improper notice to the applicant, procedural due process provides a logi-
cal remedy. The goal of procedural due process, however, is not to pre-
vent deprivations of rights, but to ensure adequate notice prior to their
occurrence. As such, procedural due process is inherently limited in its
potential application to insurers' use of HIV testing.
296. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
297. 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
298. Id. at 534.
299. Id. at 538 n.12.
300. Id.
Summer 1992] HIV TESTING
1194 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 19:1163
IV. Proposals
The main focus of constitutional challenges to insurer testing are in
the areas of privacy, equal protection, and procedural due process. De-
spite the potential basis for these new challenges, problems exist. Re-
strictive state action analysis may block challenges in states with no
existing legislation. Conservative trends in judicial decisions may ham-
per expansion of individual rights, especially in the area of equal protec-
tion. Concerns over public health may prevent courts from carefully
scrutinizing legislation.
The insurance industry has also raised issues, some of which com-
mentators have questioned.3 '01 Insurers claim testing is needed to keep
the industry financially solvent.30 2 There is some evidence this concern is
misplaced. While the cost of AIDS to health and life insurance compa-
nies is increasing, 30 3 the difference between group policies, not requiring
testing, and individual policies requiring testing, is minimal.3 1 In addi-
tion, the percentage of AIDS-related claims remains less than five per-
cent of total industry claims. 30 5 The small percentage AIDS accounts for
in the industry budget contrasts with the amount of pressure being exer-
cised by insurers in support of testing. This contrast is sharpened when
one considers that individual policies only comprise thirty percent of
health insurance and sixty percent of life insurance.30 6
Although insurers insist testing is the best and most efficient way of
doing business, other options exist. One alternative would be to use ac-
tual AIDS symptoms, such as swollen glands and weight loss, to detect
infected individuals.30 7 Using AIDS symptoms would reduce the stigma
and the confidentiality risks attached to testing. Another approach uses
different types of blood tests, such as testing for low white blood cell or
T-cell count.308
Moreover, instead of using testing at all, there are other methods of
reducing AIDS-related costs. Cost reduction alternatives include utiliz-
ing less expensive types of health care, such as home nursing, pooling
together individual policies to spread costs over more policy holders, as-
signing each insurer a certain number of persons with HIV positive sta-
301. See Schatz, supra note 12.
302. Tonery, supra note 49, at 137.
303. See supra note 10.
304. See Steven Brostoff, AIDS-Related Life Insurance Claims Jumped in 1990, NAT'L UN-
DERWRITER, Oct. 7, 1991.
305. AIDS-related health insurance claims were 1.3% of the total for individual coverage
in 1990, compared to 1.4% for group coverage. For individual life insurance, AIDS-related
claims made up 2% of the total and 3.5% of group claims in 1990. Id.
306. Cooper, supra note 10, at 3.
307. Schatz, supra note 12, at 1795.
308. Id. Both of these tests show correlations with AIDS and HIV infection.
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tus, and investing in prevention.3 °9
Blocking insurers from testing is not a new proposal. Currently,
insurance companies are not permitted to test for diethylstilbestrol
(DES), sickle cell, or Tay-Sach disease, all of which occur in certain
populations.310 Even though AIDS is new from a medical perspective, it
is similar to many other diseases. Treating it so differently may reflect
public fear and ignorance.
Current legislation is not providing insurance applicants with ade-
quate protection, especially when they are HIV positive. Although some
commentators believe strengthening existing legislation is the solution,31
constitutional-based challenges may be the only way to ensure that indi-
vidual rights are respected.
Conclusion
The AIDS crisis highlights potential constitutional violations of pri-
vacy and equal protection. Due to the nature of the disease and the pub-
lic stigma attached to it, many of these constitutional guarantees have
been overlooked.
Insurers' concerns about costly policy benefits and adverse selection
are legitimate. Protecting the solvency and efficiency of the private in-
surance industry is vital to the well being of all, but especially to those
with serious illnesses such as AIDS.
Continual breaches of confidentiality, however, pose serious threats
to the constitutional rights of applicants. Other dangers exist as well,
such as eroding the public trust, discouraging voluntary HIV testing, de-
creasing insurance availability, and slowing the search for a cure. These
interests must be given great weight and should be carefully protected.
Since current methods are failing, constitutional claims may be one
method to address the problem.
309. Schatz, supra note 12, at 1796-97; See Scherzer, Insurance, in AIDS & THE LAW,
supra note 53, at 198-201.
310. Schatz, supra note 12, at 1797-98.
311. Scherzer, Insurance, in AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 53, at 195-96.
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